HI, eu sou consultor independente e mudei para Tenerife em Expert: Julie Kingham respondeu há 6 anos OK - supondo que você não arquive nenhuma conta com a casa de empresas é justo dizer que você é um comerciante único e que divulga seus resultados de negociação Em uma declaração de imposto anual. Basicamente, para ser residente no Reino Unido, você deve estar no Reino Unido por pelo menos 183 dias por ano - então você precisa rever quantos dias você esteve no Reino Unido (à meia-noite) para o ano fiscal até a data em que você saiu. Você também precisa enviar o formulário P85 - Deixando o Reino Unido (P86 é para quando você retornar para o Reino Unido). Você talvez seja capaz de solicitar quotsplit yearquot treatment - pelo qual você é tratado como residente do Reino Unido até a data de partida e não residente no Reino Unido pelo restante do ano fiscal. No que diz respeito ao seu negócio, como você ainda estará trabalhando para empresas com sede no Reino Unido, você ainda estará sujeito ao imposto do Reino Unido sobre esse rendimento - mas você ainda se beneficiará de ter o subsídio pessoal para se estabelecer contra isso. Vale a pena procurar o conselho de um contador de conselho fiscal do Reino Unido, uma vez que as regras de residência do Reino Unido e a tributação podem ser bastante complicadas. Você também precisará considerar se você está mudando de domicílio (você quebrou todos os laços com o Reino Unido) e as implicações tributárias de quaisquer outros investimentos que você deixou no Reino Unido (como qualquer propriedade que você aluga). Como funciona JustSnswer: pergunte a um perito Os especialistas estão cheios de conhecimentos valiosos e estão prontos para ajudar com qualquer pergunta. Credenciais confirmadas por uma empresa de verificação Fortune 500. Obter uma Resposta Profissional Via email, mensagem de texto ou notificação conforme você espera em nosso site. Faça perguntas de acompanhamento se precisar. Garantia de Satisfação 100 Classifique a resposta que você recebe. JustAnswer in the News: sites da Ask-a-doc: se você tiver uma pergunta rápida, você pode tentar obter uma resposta de sites que dizem ter vários especialistas disponíveis para dar respostas rápidas. Apenas responda. Apenas responda. Tem crescido desde outubro em questões legais dos leitores sobre demissões, desemprego e indenização. O que os clientes estão dizendo: eu realmente fiquei impressionado com a pronta resposta. Seu especialista não era apenas um especialista em impostos, mas um especialista em pessoas. Sua atitude genuína e atenciosa apareceu em sua resposta. T. G.W, Matteson, IL I WON. Eu só queria que você soubesse que sua resposta original me deu coragem e confiança para entrar na auditoria de ontem pronta para lutar. Bonnie, Chesnee, SC Ótimo serviço. Respondi a minha questão fiscal complexa em detalhes e forneceu muitas informações úteis adicionais para minha situação específica. John, Minneapolis, MN Excelente informação, resposta muito rápida. Os especialistas realmente tomam o tempo para resolver suas perguntas, vale a pena a taxa, pela paz de espírito que eles podem lhe fornecer. Orville, Hesperia, Califórnia Excelente serviço, rápido, eficiente e preciso. Não poderia pedir mais. Eu não posso te agradecer o suficiente por sua ajuda. Mary C. Freshfield, Liverpool, Reino Unido Este especialista é maravilhoso. Eles realmente sabem do que estão falando, e eles realmente se importam com você. Eles realmente ajudaram a colocar meus nervos à vontade. Muito obrigado. Alex, Los Angeles, CA Obrigado por toda a sua ajuda. É bom saber que este serviço está aqui para pessoas como eu, que precisam de respostas rápidas e não tem certeza de quem consultar. Órgãos fiscais mais latos. Estruturação de oportunidades Esta solução permite que o residente do Reino Unido (quotthe contractorquot) forneça seus serviços a um ou mais Empresas do Reino Unido (quotthe usuários finais) através de uma confiança comercial (quotthe trustquot). O contratante receberá uma taxa pelo fideicomisso (que ficará sujeito a impostos), mas o fideicomisso também pode fornecer outros benefícios ao contratante, como empréstimos que não devem ser tributáveis. Continue lendo New: Alternative Business Funding Usando uma estrutura SSAS flexível, é possível permitir que um fundo de pensão seja emprestado e investido em uma empresa. Isso permite que os empresários financiem seus negócios, permitindo-lhes refinanciar dívidas, adquirir fundos, expandir ou melhorar o fluxo de caixa. Continue lendo Esta solução permite que uma empresa comercial do Reino Unido recompense um ou mais funcionários-chave com um bônus discricionário que sofre PAYE e NIC mínimos e fornece à empresa uma dedução total do imposto sobre as sociedades. Continue a ler Este arranjo permite que um residente do Reino Unido e domiciliado (quotthe Clientquot) reduza imediatamente o valor de seus bens por herança (quotIHTquot), de tal forma que não implique a transferência de ativos até após a morte do Cliente. Continue lendo Dado a multiplicidade de regras diferentes que se aplicam a investidores estrangeiros que procuram investir em imóveis residenciais do Reino Unido, neste artigo da Área de praticantes analisamos o tratamento fiscal das diferentes opções de propriedade em fevereiro de 2016. continue lendo o SDLT é cobrado no total Preço de compra para uma transação de terra. Isso geralmente inclui o preço pago pela terra e por qualquer edifício nele. Neste artigo da Área de praticantes, observamos duas idéias de planejamento SDLT principais. Continue lendo Se você é um investidor propriedadeBTL que possui propriedade pessoalmente, esta solução de planejamento tributário usa um LLP para (1) reduzir o imposto sobre o rendimento do aluguel (2) alcançar uma eliminação de propriedade gratuita da CGT (3) permite que o acesso seja acessado sem imposto (4) fornece Para a eficiência da IHT. Somente para os membros da prática. Continue a ler o Imposto de Herança - Gift Leaseback Planejamento para a casa da família Como a casa da família é o principal ativo que muitas pessoas têm, garantir que o imposto de herança seja minimizado em seu valor será muitas vezes um requisito de planejamento de IHT chave. Neste artigo do Practitioner, observamos como um Gift amp Leaseback pode ser usado para reduzir o IHT. Continue a ler Como usar quotDouble Irishquot e quotDouble Irish Dutch Sandwichquot estruturas em 2015 Em outubro, o Governo irlandês lançou propostas que resultariam em empresas irlandesas incorporadas não residentes sendo classificadas como residentes fiscais na Irlanda a partir de 1º de janeiro de 2015. O objetivo é fechar Pelo uso do chamado quotDouble Irishquot e quotDouble Irish Dutch Sandwichquot estruturas. Neste artigo da Área de praticantes, observamos detalhadamente o quotDocumentável irlandês e quotDouble Irish Dutch Sandwichquot, incluindo se eles ainda podem ser usados. Continue lendo Como os residentes do Reino Unido podem usar uma empresa maurícia para evitar o imposto sobre os ganhos de capital do Reino Unido Usar empresas estrangeiras para evitar o imposto sobre os ganhos de capital do Reino Unido é uma forma estabelecida de planejamento tributário. Infelizmente, se você quisesse usar esta técnica para evitar CGT hoje em dia está sujeita a inúmeras disposições anti evasão. Este artigo, exclusivamente para os nossos membros de profissionais, procura uma forma de contornar as regras anti-evasão. Continue lendo. Contém Prevenção Fiscal: Estratégias anti-evasivas Tradicionalmente, o tema da evasão fiscal, ou como o conter, não tem sido um foco central da literatura de finanças públicas.2 Na verdade, a Quinta edição de Finanças Públicas em Teoria e Prática3 não menciona Evasão fiscal e apenas faz a menor menção de abrigos fiscais nos contextos de quarentena de interesse e o imposto mínimo alternativo dos EUA. Esta omissão é um pouco surpreendente, uma vez que a evasão fiscal, como a evasão fiscal, tem ocorrido tanto quanto o imposto em si e pode ter um grande impacto em tantos aspectos das finanças públicas. Mas a falta de grande atenção na literatura na segunda metade do século XX pode não ser tão surpreendente quando se considera que é relativamente recente que a evasão e a evasão tornaram-se os principais fenômenos sociais que são agora. A conclusão geral de comentaristas no Reino Unido, nos EUA e em outros lugares4 é que a atividade de evasão fiscal realmente realmente cresceu significativamente nas últimas décadas. As autoridades de receitas concordam facilmente com a herança recente. Conforme observado em um recente Documento de Discussão do Serviço de Receita da África do Sul (SARS) sobre Prevenção Fiscal5, o crescimento da atividade de evasão fiscal é uma preocupação mundial e tem sido um problema crescente internacionalmente nos últimos dez anos. Um exército do que Tanzi6 e Braithwaite7 chamaram de termites fiscais e morais, tem vindo a comer fora em bases de receitas fiscais em todo o mundo de forma sem precedentes nos últimos trinta anos, e com um vigor crescente na última década. Por conseguinte, é apropriado que o tema da evasão fiscal e, mais particularmente, de como pode ser limitado ou contido deve ser um aspecto fundamental quando a reforma tributária no século XXI está em consideração neste colóquio. O documento inicialmente explora (na Seção 2) a natureza da atividade de evasão, os motivos do seu crescimento e as razões pelas quais devemos nos preocupar, a fim de fornecer o contexto e o contexto adequados. Em seguida, considera, por sua vez, as respostas administrativas (Seção 3), legislativas (Seção 4) e judiciais (Seção 5) às preocupações sobre a atividade de evasão fiscal. A separação da revisão nestas três áreas convenientes é algo arbitrária, uma vez que elas são muito mais integradas e interdependentes do que essa separação sugere. A Seção 6 oferece alguns pensamentos conclusivos. O principal objetivo do trabalho é identificar, examinar e avaliar algumas das principais tendências nas respostas que os governos nacionais e as organizações internacionais estão fazendo atualmente aos problemas de evasão fiscal. A conclusão é que as autoridades fiscais nacionais, as organizações fiscais internacionais e as legislaturas e judiciais nacionais e supranacionais têm à sua disposição uma ampla gama de estratégias anti-evasão concebidas para lidar, e geralmente são capazes de lidar, com a investida destes As chamadas termitas fiscais e morais. Além disso, há algumas evidências8 de que a batalha que está sendo travada contra a evasão fiscal generalizada está inclinando-se a favor dos defensores do fisco. Mas, embora talvez não haja necessidade de pânico fiscal ou moral, também não há espaço para a complacência. 2 Evitação de impostos: fundo O que é evasão fiscal A evasão fiscal vem sob muitos rótulos. Na Austrália, muitas vezes é referido (particularmente pelo Australian Tax Office ATO) como um planejamento tributário agressivo na África do Sul como uma evasão fiscal inadmissível ou abusiva10 na Nova Zelândia e no Reino Unido como evitação fiscal inaceitável11 e nos termos norte-americanos, como abrigos abusivos de impostos, são muitas vezes usava. Qualquer que seja o termo usado, a evasão fiscal geralmente é contrastada com a evasão fiscal, e também com a mensuração do planejamento tributário. A distinção entre evasão fiscal e evasão fiscal é bem reconhecida. É a diferença entre trabalhar fora da lei e trabalhar dentro da lei (embora contra seu espírito) .12 O ex-chanceler do Tesouro no Reino Unido, Denis Healey, sugeriu que a diferença entre evasão fiscal e evasão fiscal é a espessura de uma Parede da prisão.13 A OCDE observa que a evasão fiscal envolve acordos ilegais através ou por meio dos quais a responsabilidade fiscal é escondida ou ignorada de tal forma que o contribuinte paga menos impostos do que legalmente obrigado a pagar ao ocultar receitas ou informações das autoridades fiscais. 14 Mas a OCDE considera mais difícil oferecer uma definição tão precisa para a evasão fiscal, sugerindo, um pouco estranhamente, que a evasão fiscal 15a é um arranjo de assuntos de contribuintes destinados a reduzir sua responsabilidade e que, embora o arranjo possa ser estritamente legal Geralmente está em contradição com a intenção da lei que pretende seguir.16 A distinção entre evasão fiscal (inaceitável) e (aceitável) adiantamento fiscal Ng geralmente é reconhecido como não sendo tão claro como a distinção entre evasão e evasão. Existe uma grande legislação em todos os países, motivada pela distinção, e a proliferação de litígios na área de disposições anti-evasão específicas e gerais sugere que muitas dessas disposições legislativas não atingiram seus objetivos. Esta distinção entre evasão fiscal e mitigação fiscal foi referida no caso Willoughby, 17 em que Lord Nolan declarou: A marca de evasão fiscal é que o contribuinte reduz sua responsabilidade fiscal sem incorrer nas conseqüências econômicas que o Parlamento pretendia sofrer por qualquer contribuinte Qualificando essa redução em sua responsabilidade tributária. O salão da mitigação fiscal, por outro lado, é que o contribuinte aproveita uma opção fiscalmente atraente que lhe é concedida pela legislação e sofre verdadeiramente as consequências econômicas que o Parlamento pretendeu sofrer por quem aproveita a opção. Assim, provavelmente é razoável concluir que o planejamento tributário ou mitigação fiscal está preocupado com a organização de assuntos de contribuintes (ou a estruturação de transações) para que dêem origem ao passivo fiscal mínimo dentro da lei sem recorrer a evasão fiscal exclusiva.18 Note, no entanto, que a busca de alocação de evasão fiscal, evasão e planejamento de mitigação em compartimentos básicos pode simplificar demais a posição. Não só as linhas de fronteira entre esses três conceitos nem sempre são claras, mas alguns comentaristas muito aprendidos até lançaram dúvidas sobre a utilidade de tal categorização. Por exemplo, no caso McNiven e Westmoreland, Lord Hoffmann observou que, a menos que as disposições estatutárias contenha palavras como evasão ou mitigação, não acho que isso ajude a apresentá-las.19 Em um contexto um tanto diferente, Lord Walker de Gestingthorpe observou Que uma simples classificação tripartida da evasão fiscal evasão ilegal e criminal evasão legal mas inaceitável mitigação fiscal legal e aceitável. É também uma análise grosseira para promover a compreensão do que é um assunto bastante complexo.20 Como é que a evasão fiscal é caracterizada É possível caracterizar impostos Atividade de prevenção de várias maneiras. Por exemplo, pode-se considerar a evitação em relação aos seus objetivos, à natureza de suas atividades, ou por referência às suas principais características. Objetivos de evasão fiscal Obter a essência da evasão fiscal talvez requer uma compreensão de seus objetivos o que a evasão fiscal pretende alcançar. Claramente, o jogo final é uma redução da responsabilidade fiscal, mas isso pode assumir uma série de formas. É possível identificar quatro objetivos possíveis que sustentam a atividade de evasão fiscal: re-caracterização de remoção de eliminação e / ou mudança.21 O primeiro objetivo possível, a eliminação permanente de uma responsabilidade tributária não precisa de mais explicações, e é presumivelmente o evasão fiscal nirvana.22 O diferimento envolve O adiamento do pagamento de uma obrigação tributária e baseia-se no conceito de valor temporal do dinheiro para sua efetividade.23 A re-caracterização é simplesmente a conversão do caráter de um item ou transação, por exemplo, de um tributado ou de um imposto tributado Item como receita para um item isento de impostos ou menos fortemente gravado como capital.24 A quarta mudança de metas possível pode se relacionar com a mudança de renda ou lucro (como na mudança de um passivo de uma entidade altamente tributada para uma entidade menos fortemente tributada ou até mesmo isenta25) como Bem como o valor de deslocamento26 onde o valor é deslocado entre os ativos. A realização de qualquer um ou todos esses objetivos só é possível devido ao potencial de alavancagem fiscal ou arbitragem fiscal que surge como resultado das chamadas inconsistências e descontinuidades existentes nas jurisdições fiscais nacionais e nas fronteiras fiscais internacionais. É claro que as inconsistências e descontinuidades que são evidentes dentro e entre os sistemas fiscais não são susceptíveis de desaparecer, existem por muito bons motivos. As distinções entre, por exemplo, a dívida e a equidade, ou o capital e a receita, ou entre a avaliação de diferentes tipos de entidades e diferentes níveis de renda são partes fundamentais dos sistemas fiscais nacionais e existem por razões políticas e políticas. Mas temos que estar cientes das conseqüências. Como Jeff Waincymer ressalta: taxas progressivas de tributação incentivam as técnicas de divisão de renda, as despesas fiscais em favor de atividades consideradas dignas de encorajamento levam à criação de abrigos inspirados por impostos, as necessidades administrativas, como a limitação do exercício tributário a um determinado período, encorajam manipulações da Calendário das deduções e recebimentos de fluxos de renda.27 As técnicas de evasão fiscal Tendo identificado os objetivos e apreciando que esses objetivos são alcançados através da manipulação dos desajustes dentro e entre os sistemas tributários, identificar as várias técnicas contemporâneas de evasão fiscal não é difícil Tarefa, embora não seja de forma alguma subestimar a ingenuidade de seu design ou a complexidade de sua construção, que muitas vezes é uma característica de tais esquemas. Lord Walker de Gestingthorpe, em um documento inédito28 apresentado pouco depois da decisão no caso de Ramsay29 foi proferido pela House of Lords, identificou sete tipos de evasão fiscal, passando do caso mais simples para o cada vez mais complexo (e para a maioria dos observadores, cada vez mais censurável ). Estes foram: 1. usando um alívio 2. encontrando uma lacuna 3. explorando (ou abusando) um alívio 4. o karatê anti-evasão (pelo qual ele quis dizer a capacidade dos contribuintes para aproveitar suas próprias vantagens disposições legais destinadas a evitar a evasão fiscal ) 5. ativos ou transacções não naturais. 6. transações pré-ordenadas e 7. esquemas offshore desviados. Muitos argumentariam (como Lord Walker admite prontamente) que a primeira não é a evasão fiscal, que é diretamente dentro dos domínios da mitigação fiscal. O professor Willoughby, por exemplo, não estava envolvido em um esquema elaborado ou artificial destinado à evasão fiscal. Como o julgamento em seu caso mostra claramente, ele esteve envolvido na utilização de um regime tributário promulgado pelo Parlamento que proporcionou o diferimento de impostos para a salvação de aposentadoria de longo prazo de boa-fé. Mas antes de concluir prontamente que o uso de um alívio não deve figurar em qualquer taxonomia de evasão, vale a pena ter em mente que o caso mais recente da Câmara dos Lordes de Barclays Mercantile 31, que envolveu um esquema elaborado e elaborado, foi em Essência simplesmente sobre uma empresa de leasing financeiro aproveitando um alívio (neste caso, subsídios de capital) que o Parlamento pretendia beneficiar essas empresas. O fato de o contribuinte tanto em Willoughby quanto em Barclays Mercantile ter sucesso não significa que simplesmente usar um alívio pode ser facilmente descartado da hierarquia de estratégias de evasão de Lord Walkers. E, do mesmo jeito (novamente concedido por Lord Walker), nem todos os esquemas offshore são por qualquer extensão da imaginação digna do rótulo de desonesto. As principais características da evasão fiscal Muitas técnicas compartilham uma série de características comuns, a maioria dos quais é resumida com muita competência no documento sobre evasão fiscal preparado no final de 2005 pelo Serviço da Receita da África do Sul.32 Na opinião dessa autoridade de receita, os crachás ou As marcas de evasão típicas geralmente incluem qualquer ou todas as seguintes características: a falta de substância econômica (geralmente resultante de arranjos pré-organizados de circulação ou auto-cancelamento), com o resultado de que um investimento aparentemente provável é, finalmente, ilusório e, Através de vários dispositivos, o contribuinte permanece isolado de praticamente todos os riscos econômicos, ao mesmo tempo em que criou uma impressão cuidadosamente elaborada ao contrário, o uso de partes acomodatórias indiferentes aos impostos ou entidades de propósito especial, muitas vezes referidas no jargão como lavadoras etapas desnecessárias e complexidade, Muitas vezes inserido para sustentar uma reivindicação de propósito comercial, ou para disfarçar a verdadeira natureza de um esquema ou como um dispositivo t O bloqueio da transação de abrigo fiscal da detecção33 tratamento inconsistente para fins contábeis fiscais e financeiros altos custos de transação taxas de variação de taxa ou provisão de taxa contingente o uso de novos instrumentos financeiros complexos, tais como derivados, híbridos e instrumentos sintéticos que possibilitaram a promotores Imita quase que perfeitamente os riscos e retornos atribuíveis a instrumentos financeiros mais tradicionais, como ações ordinárias ou dívidas simples de baunilha sem incorrer, pelo menos em teoria, nas conseqüências tributárias tipicamente associadas a eles e ao uso de paraísos fiscais, particularmente no contexto do seguro cativo Empresas, subsidiárias de financiamento cativo e companhias de propriedade intangíveis. Claro que isso não é sugerir que a existência dessas características, isoladas ou em combinação, deve necessariamente apontar para a existência de atividade de evasão fiscal. Essa conclusão só pode ser elaborada após uma cuidadosa consideração de todos os fatos. Mas é sugerir que, à primeira vista, a existência dessas características, isoladas ou em combinação, pode indicar atividade de evasão. O Grupo Anti-Evidência (AAG) de Her Majestys Revenue and Customs (HMRC) no Reino Unido desenvolveu uma lista semelhante de sinalizadores, identificando os fatores que considera que podem indicar evasão.34 Estes incluem Transações ou acordos que têm pouca ou nenhuma economia Substância ou que tenham consequências fiscais não proporcionais à mudança na posição econômica de um contribuinte (ou grupo de contribuintes relacionados). Por exemplo, o abuso de correspondência forex onde a posição é plana em substância econômica, mas o benefício de retrospectiva pode ser usado para escolher qual das duas posições iguais e opostas é tributada. Transações ou acordos com pouco ou nenhum lucro antes de impostos que dependem total ou substancialmente de redução de impostos antecipada para lucro pós-imposto significativo. Por exemplo, compra de dividendos, onde o valor do crédito de imposto estrangeiro mais do que compensa uma perda antes de impostos e as perdas de strip-tease douradas inventadas contrabalançadas por ganhos em ativos isentos, como opções. Transações ou arranjos que resultam em desajustes, tais como: entre a forma jurídica ou o tratamento contábil e a substância econômica ou entre o tratamento tributário para diferentes partes ou entidades ou entre o tratamento tributário em diferentes jurisdições. Por exemplo, uma transação em que um pagamento é tratado como uma despesa em uma jurisdição, mas o recibo correspondente não é renda tributável em outra jurisdição. Transações ou arranjos que exibem pouco ou nenhum negócio, motorista comercial ou não-tributário. Por exemplo, os esquemas de filmes que criam prejuízos fiscais em excesso do verdadeiro investimento comercial. Transações ou acordos envolvendo etapas ou transações artificiais, transitórias, pré-ordenadas ou comercialmente desnecessárias. Por exemplo, o uso de arranjos artificiais projetados para tirar ativos do regime de tributação de herança, ao mesmo tempo em que permite que o antigo proprietário continue desfrutando os benefícios da propriedade. Transacções ou acordos em que os rendimentos, ganhos, despesas ou perdas abrangidos pela taxa líquida do Reino Unido não são proporcionais à actividade económica que ocorre ou ao valor acrescentado no Reino Unido 8211, especialmente nos casos em que as transacções ou acordos são entre empresas associadas da mesma entidade económica e Não teria ocorrido entre partes que agissem no comprimento do braço e não adicionem valor à entidade econômica como um todo. Por exemplo, a transferência da propriedade de um fluxo de renda de uma empresa residente no Reino Unido para uma empresa associada residente em uma jurisdição tributária lowno em circunstâncias em que a atividade econômica que deu origem ao rendimento não acompanha a transferência de propriedade e ou não há benefícios econômicos para A entidade econômica como um todo. Por que a evasão fiscal se torna mais prevalente Muitas razões para o crescimento da atividade de evasão na última parte do século XX e parte inicial disso foram avançadas na literatura. Braithwaite35 identificou a globalização, aumentando a desregulamentação e as mudanças nas forças do mercado como causas principais. Na verdade, Braithwaite posiciona seu trabalho diretamente em um contexto de mercado mais amplo. Ele mostra como as ondas de planejamento tributário agressivo na Austrália e em outros lugares foram inicialmente impulsionadas por oferta. É sua afirmação de que um grupo relativamente pequeno de promotores, incluindo alguns que atuam fora das principais instituições financeiras e, mais recentemente, as grandes empresas contábeis do Big Four, foram a força motriz por trás de muitos dos esquemas que foram adotados pelos contribuintes na Austrália E em outros lugares. O mesmo ponto é feito por Richards, que observa que a sabedoria convencional é que a maior parte do planejamento e marketing de massa emana das empresas de contabilidade.36 Também há poucas dúvidas de que o fornecimento de produtos de evasão fiscal no mercado foi alimentado por A disponibilidade de recursos humanos talentosos preparados para trabalhar na área e por avanços rápidos em informática e tecnologia de telecomunicações, que aumentaram consideravelmente a capacidade dos bancos de investimento, empresas de contabilidade e outros consultores fiscais de criar sofisticados modelos fiscais e financeiros para o mercado para múltiplos contribuintes.37 Isso A abundância de oferta, por sua vez, criou uma demanda de oportunidades agressivas de planejamento tributário de um grupo muito maior de contribuintes, que sentem que não devem perder o que o grande fim da cidade pode apreciar. Como Pederick38 notou há muitos anos: o cinismo cresce rapidamente e uma corrida para não ser deixada fora do derby de minimização de impostos, por gancho ou por escravo, infecta o corpo político. O Tesouro dos EUA39 observou que mudar as atitudes pode desempenhar um papel importante no crescimento dos abrigos fiscais corporativos nas últimas décadas. É simplesmente um reflexo de atitudes mais aceitas de conselheiros fiscais e executivos corporativos em direção a um planejamento tributário agressivo. E a demanda não é apenas agora restrita àqueles no extremo superior da cidade. Por exemplo, o crescimento no meio do final da década de 1990 dos esquemas de evasão de impostos comercializados em massa pedalados pela brigada de calçados brancos40 para trabalhadores de colarinho azul de alta renda operando nos setores de recursos nas partes mais remotas da Austrália mostraram que a atividade de evasão fiscal é agora uma grande quantidade Fenômeno mais abrangente e abrangente do que era nos anos anteriores. Essa observação não se limita à Austrália. O crescimento da atividade de evasão fiscal é um problema. A questão, é claro, precisa ser questionada sobre se todo esse crescimento na atividade de prevenção deve ser motivo de preocupação. A resposta a esta questão é relativamente direta. Em primeiro lugar, e talvez o mais importante, afeta negativamente a capacidade das jurisdições fiscais nacionais para cobrar as receitas necessárias para o bom desempenho das funções governamentais. A coleta de receita é a principal função de qualquer sistema tributário, e a atividade de evasão sistemática e generalizada terá claramente um impacto negativo nessa função. Não há estimativas confiáveis sobre as perdas para os tesouros nacionais como resultado da atividade de evasão, mas os montantes provavelmente serão muito significativos. Por exemplo, uma estimativa sugeriu que a atividade de refúgio fiscal sozinha resultou em perdas de receita anuais para outros países em excesso de US $ 50 bilhões.41 No Reino Unido, a perda de impostos de evasão é estimada em vários bilhões de libras, tanto direta quanto indireta Impostos.42 Quando as receitas fiscais não fluem conforme previsto, ou quando grandes quantidades de receita esperada são desviadas por atividades de evasão bem-sucedidas, as cortes na despesa do governo seguirão, com as conseqüentes dificuldades sociais e políticas que tais cortes podem trazer.43 Mas o prejudicial Os efeitos da atividade de evasão fiscal vão muito além do seu impacto nas cobranças de receita. Eles também afetam significativamente a eficiência e a equidade dos sistemas tributários. Esses impactos são cuidadosamente encapsulados pelo Bankman44, onde ele observa que os abrigos fiscais sipoham recursos de empreendimentos mais produtivos, redistribuem a carga tributária e ameaçam minar o cumprimento. Como a OCDE também observou, qualquer proliferação de esquemas arbitrários e artificiais para a percepção de que o sistema é injusto, o que pode desencorajar o cumprimento, mesmo pelos contribuintes que anteriormente não se comprometeram na evasão fiscal45. Também não deve ser esquecido que grande parte da complexidade da modernidade Os sistemas fiscais são um resultado direto da introdução de medidas específicas de integridade, envolvendo uma legislação anti-evasão enrolada, projetada para combater os abusos de evasão reais e percebidos. Por conseguinte, pode-se concluir com segurança que o crescimento da atividade de evasão fiscal é motivo de grande preocupação, pois pode reduzir as cobranças de receita, introduzir ineficiências econômicas ao distorcer o comportamento econômico, minar a integridade dos sistemas fiscais nacionais e apresentar uma série de recursos adicionais E complexidades indesejadas para esses sistemas. As próximas seções do artigo analisam as diversas respostas anti-evasão que surgiram dos governos nacionais e organizações internacionais e identificam as estratégias-chave que foram implementadas nas tentativas de conter e contrariar atividades de prevenção. A análise começa com a consideração do que pode ser denominado resposta das autoridades fiscais, especialmente no trabalho das agências nacionais e internacionais de receitas. Em seguida, considera as respostas legislativas e judiciais. Embora as respostas administrativas, legislativas e judiciais sejam consideradas separadamente para os propósitos do trabalho, deve-se enfatizar que, na prática, estão estreitamente interligados e interdependentes. Além disso, precisa ser reconhecido que outras forças também estão trabalhando para contrariar alguns dos efeitos da evasão. Por exemplo, taxas de imposto mais baixas podem estar associadas a uma atividade de evasão decrescente e, portanto, as pressões internacionais para a redução das taxas de imposto desde a década de 1980 podem ter desempenhado algum papel em contrariar a evasão. As autoridades de receita também se tornaram cada vez mais conscientes da importância de fornecer incentivos, ou cenouras de conformidade, para a grande maioria dos contribuintes que desejam cumprir suas obrigações tributárias, em vez de simplesmente vencer os contribuintes com as várias varas que estão disponíveis para eles. Este tema de conformidade cooperativa é mencionado, mas não totalmente desenvolvido no documento que, por sua natureza, não está focado no cumprimento. 3 Estratégias de autoridades fiscais para evitar as autoridades fiscais nacionais têm sido muito ativas para garantir que seu mecanismo administrativo esteja bem posicionado como possivelmente seja para identificar e contrariar o que eles consideram uma atividade de evasão fiscal inaceitável. Mesmo o mais superficial de redes de arrasto através de sites de escritórios fiscais em todo o mundo traz uma série de iniciativas nacionais. Exemplos extraídos de apenas duas jurisdições, o Reino Unido e a Austrália, ilustram o tipo de iniciativas para combater a evasão que atualmente tipificam respostas nacionais46. No Reino Unido, a Revista 2006 de Links com Grandes Negócios (The Varney Review) molda grande parte do pensamento atual sobre conformidade, E, portanto, sobre estratégias anti-evasão. O foco da Varney Review é sobre os resultados projetados para melhorar a atratividade do ambiente administrativo do imposto de negócios no Reino Unido e, nesse contexto, identificou quatro temas-chave: gerenciamento de risco de certeza resolução rápida de problemas e clareza através de consulta efetiva. These themes have prompted a call for new kinds of relationships to be forged between HMRC and the business community where the watchwords are disclosure, transparency, co - operation and proportionality.47 Within this context, the development, maintenance and delivery of HMRC anti - avoidance policies and strategies is the direct responsibility of the Anti-Avoidance Group (AAG). The AAG has an important role in delivering the aims of HMRC and its broader compliance strategy. The AAGs published strategies include48 making tax law robust against avoidance engaging with its customers about its approach to avoidance optimising its operational response to avoidance and changing the economics of avoidance to make it less attractive. More specifically, the AAG identifies a series of actions designed to achieve these outcomes. These are: This robust and proactive approach to avoidance activity is based upon real time-time intelligence (often made available through the scheme disclosure rules discussed later in the paper), together with the sensible application of the principles of risk management and proportionality. It fits comfortably within the broader cooperative compliance framework espoused in the Varney Review and HMRC publications. Similar trends are visible in Australia. The ATO publishes a comprehensive annual compliance program49 which describes the tax compliance risks it is most concerned about and what it is doing to address them. Aggressive tax planning, which the ATO defines as the use of transactions or arrangements that have little or no economic substance and are created predominantly to obtain a tax benefit that is not intended by the law, features as a prominent part of that annual program. The program identifies the ATOs general approach to aggressive tax planning, certain headline issues, and its current focus and priorities, as well as actions taken and successes achieved in the preceding year. The approach of the ATO to large business was spelled out in a 2007 speech by the Commissioner50. In that speech the Commissioner notes that the challenge for large business and the Tax Office is to create certainty through transparency and cooperation, and emphasises the current ATO mantra of consultation, collaboration and co-design. Mention is also made of two Forward Compliance Arrangements made with the ANZ bank and BP in the areas of GST and Excise, designed to promote governance arrangements that reduce the companys risk of audits, tax litigation, penalties and interest, and also streamline access to support and advice. Further developments in the direction of such compliance arrangements took place in May 2008, when the Commissioner of Taxation announced that the top 50 companies by turnover in Australia will be given the option of entering into an Annual Compliance Arrangement (ACA) with the Tax Office on a voluntary basis.51 The intention of ACAs is to provide these companies with certainty in relation to their tax position. Under an ACA the ATO would issue the taxpayer with a sign-off letter confirming the outcomes of a joint risk assessment (including the development of a risk management plan). To the extent of the disclosure, the ATO would agree not to audit low risk matters, and for higher risk issues the company would know what those issues are. The ACAs are built around the company that enters into the arrangement with the ATO having sound tax risk management processes, and making full and true disclosure. There is an expectation of sound corporate governance, early dialogue and mitigation of tax risks. In summary, the UK and Australian responses to aggressive tax planning have moved beyond the command and control frameworks that typified the 1970s and 1980s to one of responsive regulation and meta risk management from the 1990s onwards.52 Braithwaite explains that under the command and control approach taxpayers lodged their returns, the revenue authority assessed them and decided how much tax was due. Audits were conducted to detect the provision of false information on returns, which, when detected, typically resulted in the imposition of modest penalties.53 That command and control mentality involved the seesaw of carrot and stick approaches, oscillating between a customer service focus and one which relied on punitive legal action, depending on whichever particular philosophy happened to be in the ascendant at a particular time within the organisation. Responsive regulation involves an enforcement pyramid (now encapsulated in Australia in the ATOs Compliance Model) in which the bulk of taxpayers engaged in cooperative compliance are situated at the base of the pyramid, while a small hard - core of recalcitrant offenders are at the apex. Little enforcement activity is required for those at the base of the pyramid essentially they require only the positive encouragement to comply. On the other hand the revenue authority possesses a credible capacity to escalate up the pyramid to progressively more severe sanctions in the face of persistently aggressive non-compliance. In Braithwaites terms, responsive regulation involves sending clear signals through concrete enforcement actions that the agency is willing to escalate in order to create a culture where systemic preventive solutions and good relationships with taxpayers will do most of the compliance work.54 As part of this responsive regulation, meta risk management simply refers to the risk management of risk management.55 It entails, as in the UK and Australia, revenue authority monitoring of the tax communitys self monitoring and self regulation. Initiatives undertaken by national revenue authorities such as those outlined above for the UK and Australia have been supplemented by many international activities involving cooperation between tax authorities and work by multinational organisations. Work done on the elimination of tax havens and harmful tax competition by the OECD56 would be just one example of the sorts of initiatives that have been taken in this area. More recently the Forum for Tax Administration established by the OECD in 2002 and attended by national Taxation Commissioners since 2004 with a mandate to develop effective responses to current administrative issues in a collaborative way by working with member and certain non-member countries has considered the challenges faced with non-compliance with tax laws in an international context. In September 2006, 35 Commissioners or Deputy Commissioners signed the Seoul Declaration which stated that: Each country differs in the level and structure of its taxes, but all countries both low and high tax countries, developed and developing agree that once national tax laws have been enacted, they need to be enforced. Enforcement of our respective tax laws has become more difficult as trade and capital liberalisation and advances in communications technologies have opened the global marketplace to a wider spectrum of taxpayers. While this more open economic environment is good for business and global growth, it can lead to structures which challenge tax rules, and schemes and arrangements by both domestic and foreign taxpayers to facilitate non-compliance with our national tax laws. It is our duty as heads of our respective countries revenue bodies to ensure compliance with our national tax laws by all taxpayers, including activities beyond our borders, through effective enforcement and by taking preventive measures that deter non-compliance.57 The Seoul Declaration set up an OECD study to examine the role of tax intermediaries (advisers) in relation to non-compliance and the promotion of unacceptable tax minimisation arrangements. The final report58 emanating from the study concluded that some tax advisers do play a critical role in designing and promoting aggressive tax planning, but that it was overly simplistic to focus just on the supply side. Taxpayers themselves represent the demand side for aggressive tax planning, setting their own strategies for tax-risk management and determining their own appetites for tax risk. The report therefore considered the tripartite relationship between revenue bodies, taxpayers and tax advisers, and concluded that appropriate risk management tools were vital for revenue bodies. It further considered that revenue bodies needed to operate using the five following attributes in their dealings with all taxpayers: understanding based on commercial awareness impartiality proportionality openness (disclosure and transparency) and responsiveness. The report noted that if revenue bodies demonstrate these five attributes and have effective risk-management processes in place, this should encourage large corporate taxpayers to engage in a relationship with revenue bodies based on co-operation and trust, described in the report as an enhanced relationship59. Such an enhanced relationship would benefit both the revenue authority and the taxpayer (through greater certainty and lower compliance costs). The report also accepted, however, that not all taxpayers would wish to adopt such enhanced relationships and that the demand for aggressive tax planning will not disappear completely. Thus revenue bodies will need to have effective risk-management processes in place to identify these taxpayers and allocate the necessary level of resources to deal with them.60 A further example of international cooperation between national tax authorities, this time outside the OECD, is the work of the Joint International Tax Shelter Information Centre (JITSIC) in countering international cross-border tax arbitrage activities on a real time basis. JITSIC was established in May 2004 between the tax authorities of Australia, Canada, the UK and the US, with the objective of supplementing the ongoing work of tax administrations in identifying and curbing abusive tax avoidance transactions, arrangements, and schemes.61 An early Press Release noted that an initial focus would include the ways in which financial products are used in abusive tax transactions by corporations and individuals to reduce their tax liabilities, and the identifications of promoters developing and marketing those products and arrangements. 62 The purpose of this international task force is to: provide support to the parties through the identification and understanding of abusive tax schemes and those who promote them share expertise, best practice and experience in tax administration to combat abusive tax schemes exchange information on abusive tax schemes, in general, and on specific schemes, their promoters and investors, consistent with the provisions of bilateral tax conventions and enable the parties to address better the abusive tax schemes promoted by firms and individuals who operate without regard to national borders.63 Boyle64 has suggested that there are initial indications that JITSIC8217s efforts are working and cites Mark Everson, then the head of the IRS, as saying: We have seen things we either would never have picked up or would have picked up years down the road 8230. We have seen a series of kinds of transactions, or in some cases particular transactions, that merit follow-up by the individual taxing a uthorities. Boyle also notes, however, that the actual output and practical impact of the organisation is difficult to ascertain as a result of the secrecy that surrounds much of JITSICs operations. These specific examples of international collaboration between some of the revenue authorities and there are plenty of other examples of both broader and narrower cooperation65 illustrate that governmental responses to tax avoidance activity - just like the avoidance activities themselves go well beyond national borders. Revenue authorities have shown themselves to be more than willing to adopt a proactive and cooperative administrative stance to complement national activities and activities in the legislative and judicial spheres. The paper now considers some of those legislative and judicial initiatives. 4 Legislative responses to avoidance activity Common law jurisdictions have not been reluctant to adopt direct legislative responses to the threats posed by avoidance activity, and the pace of the introduction of such measures has quickened in direct response to the perceived growth in the threat. Legislative responses have been on a number of broad fronts: the introduction in all jurisdictions of specific or targeted anti-avoidance rules (SAARs and TAARs) aimed at particular areas where abuse has been identified or where revenue leakage is suspected, together with the continuing refinement and use of general anti-avoidance rules (GAARs) and legal principles in a number of the jurisdictions the use of product or scheme disclosure rules to obtain real-time intelligence on avoidance market developments and the use of promoter penalty rules as a further weapon in the arsenals available to revenue authorities and the use of principles based drafting to combat avoidance activities. These three broad areas are dealt with in turn, by reference to some major recent developments in some of the common law jurisdictions. Specific legislation targeting tax avoidance The intellectual dexterity of advisers and the complexity of commercial transactions have, over recent years, caused a mushrooming of schemes and arrangements that have attracted revenue authority attention and later the introduction of specific anti - avoidance rules to control their effectiveness. The use of specific integrity measures as opposed to the use of general anti-avoidance rules which are dealt with later has the advantage of precision. They are the smart bombs in contrast to the carpet bombs or weapons of mass destruction66 that may be represented by general anti - avoidance provisions. But they also carry the concern that their aim can be poor or that their impact can be deflected. Sometimes conceived in haste and rushed through national parliaments without due concern for the careful legislative drafting that must accompany any new tax measure, scheme promoters and tax advisers are often able to dodge their impact and even to incorporate them into fresh iterations of avoidance activity the anti - avoidance karate identified by Lord Walker which was mentioned earlier. The Australian experience with the introduction of specific anti-avoidance measures designed to clamp-down on the alienation of personal services income through the use of interposed entities, introduced to operate with effect from 1 July 2000, is a classic example.67 The initial legislation was well-intentioned but poorly conceived, and it is only after a number of refinements and amendments have passed through Parliament over the ensuing years that the measures have begun to operate as intended. The UK has been among the more prolific of the common law jurisdictions in introducing new specific anti-avoidance measures in recent years. For example, the 2005 Budget saw the introduction of three new and extensive sets of specific anti - avoidance rules targeting, respectively, arbitrage, double tax relief avoidance and financial avoidance, as well as even more specific provisions to address abusive film schemes. Two principal factors likely account for the UKs greater reliance on specific anti - avoidance measures. In the first place, the UK in contrast to Hong Kong, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa does not have a statutory general anti - avoidance provision. While the existence of such a provision will never obviate the need for specific anti-avoidance legislation, and many of those countries who do have such a general rule still manage to generate plenty of specific provisions of their own, those countries with a general anti-avoidance rule do appear to be able to get away with less legislative enactment in this area.68 The second reason for the spate of specific anti-avoidance measures in the UK lies in its recent adoption which is dealt with later of a disclosure regime whereby promoters and users of potentially abusive tax avoidance schemes are required to disclose details of those schemes when they are first available for implementation. This boost to real time intelligence has led directly to the introduction of specific legislative measures to counter the identified abuse. General anti-avoidance provisions The second legislative response to tax avoidance activity is the continuing refinement and use of GAARs in a number of the jurisdictions. The 1998 Consultative Document on the possible introduction of a general anti-avoidance rule for direct taxes in the UK noted then69that the United Kingdom is unusual among developed countries in having neither a statute nor an established legal principle to counter tax avoidance in general. Many other countries in the developed world have found such a rule or principle to be a very useful remedy for countering tax avoidance, although not a universal cure. General anti-avoidance rules have operated for many years in most other common law jurisdictions, including Hong Kong (sections 61 and 61A of the Inland Revenue Ordinance), Canada, (section 245 of the Canadian Income Tax Act), New Zealand (sections BG1 and GB1 of the New Zealand Income Tax Act 1994), South Africa (sections 80A to 80L of the Income Tax Act 1962) and Australia. Australian governments use a variety of general anti-avoidance rules to combat what are perceived to be abusive avoidance activities. These include Pt IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, section 67 of the Fringe Benefits Tax Assessment Act 1986 and Div 165 of the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999. It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the general anti-avoidance rules in each of the countries where they have operated. Much, obviously, depends upon the perspective adopted. In South Africa, for example, the South African Revenue Service held such grave concerns about the effectiveness of its previous GAAR that a completely fresh approach was adopted with a new provision enacted in late 2006.70 Brian Arnold, writing about recent court decisions in Canada71 notes that these decisions will inexorably render the rule largely ineffective, though Revenue Canada has enjoyed some success in the courts subsequently, particularly in the Mathew case.72 In New Zealand the general anti-avoidance rules have operated with mixed success. Its own High Court recently held in Accent Management Ltd73 that a forestry investment scheme involving a host of the hall marks that have been suggested are likely to constitute tax avoidance was in fact tax avoidance. In contrast, the Privy Council somewhat uncertainly held in the Peterson74 case that a film scheme which had many of those same hall marks was not avoidance within the terms of the New Zealand general anti-avoidance rule. The application of the general anti-avoidance provisions has also been anything but certain in Australia. The Commissioner of Taxation has enjoyed considerable success in using the rule to counter aggressive tax planning in the form of mass marketed schemes.75 However, the four cases on Part IVA that have been litigated in Australias High Court thus far Peabody, Spotless, Consolidated Press Holdings and Hart76 have produced mixed results for the Commissioner and have not always provided practitioners with the clear guidance that they often crave as to how the provisions will apply in the particular circumstances in which they are required to advise their clients. An analysis conducted by the UKs HMRC in 2006 of the general anti-avoidance provisions in a number of countries came to three broad conclusions. Firstly, that the tax landscape of each country was a product of many and diverse factors, including that countrys own history, culture and economic development. As a result, successful strategies in one country could not automatically be transported to another. Secondly, the approach of the judiciary to tax cases in general and avoidance in particular was vital to the effectiveness of anti-avoidance measures. And thirdly, that the impact of a particular anti-avoidance measure was heavily dependent upon the interaction of all the components of a compliance regime. For example, even the strongest GAARs were likely to be ineffective where avoidance schemes were unlikely to be detected in either the marketing phase or at the point at which returns were submitted and they would also be ineffective if the revenue authority was unwilling to litigate avoidance cases.77 There is, therefore, no obvious conclusion as to whether the arsenal of anti-avoidance weaponry is better served with or without a general anti-avoidance measure. The US where judges have applied a robust, practical and commercial approach to tax avoidance cases appears not to need such a rule. In the UK the jury is out. In most of those countries that do have a general anti-avoidance rule the provisions usually appear to operate successfully, but only as in all provisions of last resort where they are used sparingly. Over-use by revenue authorities is an abuse and can only serve to depreciate the value of the provision. Product disclosure rules and promoter penalty regimes The second area where there have been significant recent developments on the legislative front is the enactment, in many of the common law jurisdictions, of productscheme disclosure legislation and promoter penalty regimes. Both types of legislative provision are designed to counter, essentially, the mass marketing of what might be loosely called tax exploitation schemes (to borrow the Australian terminology), although both are equally capable of dealing with boutique or one-off avoidance activity. Product disclosure schemes represent a pre-emptive strike, in that they have the capacity to provide revenue authorities with real time intelligence that can allow governments to move rapidly to close down loopholes and block avoidance. Promoter penalty regimes are more reactive and punitive, but can nonetheless act as a significant deterrent to those who might seek to market abusive tax schemes. In 2004 the UK followed the lead of the US78 and Canada by enacting legislation79 designed to provide the tax authority with early information about tax arrangements and how they work, together with information about who has used them.80 Tax arrangements were carefully defined to include any arrangement (for example, a scheme, transaction or series of transactions) that will, or might be expected to, provide the user with a tax advantage when compared to adopting a different course of action. When the disclosure regime was introduced in the UK in 2004, disclosure was limited in scope to tax arrangements concerning employment (for example share schemes) or certain financial products. This was significantly widened with effect from August 2006 to the whole of income tax, corporation tax and capital gains tax. There are also disclosure rules relating to Stamp Duty Land Tax, VAT, and since May 2007 National Insurance Contributions. The introduction of these disclosure requirements in the UK initially caused widespread concern within the tax profession. That concern seems, to some extent, to have been dissipated by the introduction of hallmarking, which was designed to limit the need to disclose all tax efficient schemes the intention of the hallmarks (for example, tests such as confidentiality, premium fees, the presence of off-market terms) being to limit disclosure to only those schemes that are new, innovative, or of specific concern. Certainly a House of Lords Select Committee was pleased to note in 2006 the consensus among private sector witnesses that the rules were working well.81 Those rules have certainly provided HMRC with unparalleled access to real - time intelligence that has enabled it to move swiftly to legislate against avoidance activity deemed to be a threat to the revenue base. Table One: UK Disclosures Statistics Table One shows scheme disclosures in the first four years of operation of the rules. Note that the statistics do not show the numbers of users of the schemes, as details of clients and users are not required under the rules. Nor do the statistics show the number of generic schemes disclosed, as more than one person may disclose the same type of scheme. Australia (and likewise Hong Kong, New Zealand and South Africa) has not yet implemented a disclosure regime of this nature, though it is a matter of some speculation as to whether it is merely a question of time before the revenue authorities in those countries manage to persuade their political masters of the absolute necessity for such wide-reaching provisions. But, to date and in Australia at least, the recent emphasis has been upon the enactment of legislation designed to impose penalties upon the promoters of what have been labelled tax exploitation schemes. Legislation82designed to deter the promotion of tax exploitation schemes in Australia was introduced in early 2006. The legislative provisions seek to deter: the promotion of tax avoidance and evasion schemes (collectively referred to in the legislation as tax exploitation schemes) and the implementation of schemes that have been promoted on the basis of conformity with a product ruling, in a way that is materially different to that described in the product ruling. In summary83the provisions enable the Commissioner to: request the Federal Court of Australia to impose a civil penalty on a scheme promoter or implementer. The maximum penalty the Federal Court can impose is the greater of 5,000 penalty units (currently equal to AUD550,000) for an individual or 25,000 penalty units (currently equal to AUD2.75 million) for a body corporate and twice the consideration received or receivable, directly or indirectly, by the entity or its associates in respect of the scheme seek an injunction to stop the promotion of a scheme or implementation of a scheme not in conformity to its product ruling and enter into voluntary undertakings with promoters or implementers about the way in which schemes are being promoted or implemented. In deciding what penalty is appropriate, the Federal Court can have regard to all matters it considers relevant, including the amount of loss or damage incurred by scheme participants and the honesty and deliberateness of the promoter8217s conduct. The Explanatory Memorandum notes84that the civil penalty regime is not intended to inhibit the provision of independent and objective tax advice, including advice regarding tax planning. Some commentators have, however, expressed serious reservations about the potential impact on tax advisers providing tax planning advice, as well as expressing concerns about many other aspects of the promoter penalty provisions.85 Principles based drafting Sir Ivor Richardson long ago suggested that traditional legislative drafting techniques where certainty and precision are sought through the detailed expression of policies in the variety of complex circumstances in which they will operate and too often the intent is lost or blurred in a legislative fog86 may be inappropriate for tax law. There have been serious attempts in various jurisdictions since then to adopt a more principles-based approach to legislative drafting. In the UK in recent years this has been extended to an attempt to draft principles-based legislation to tackle avoidance activity. This was part of the simplification package announced by the UK Government in the Pre Budget Report in 2007.87 Late in 2007 HM Treasury and HMRC jointly released a consultation document88 which seeks to use principles-based legislation to tackle avoidance arising from or through disguised interest89 and sales of income streams arrangements.90 Principles based legislation strives to embody a principle of UK taxation, and it is proposed that the principle would be accompanied by a statement of how the legislation intends to operate by reference to that principle. Thus, for example, the principle dealing with disguised interest simply states: A return designed to be economically equivalent to interest is to be taxed in the same way as interest. It is argued that the introduction of such legislation will allow the repeal of significant amounts of existing legislation. Other claimed benefits include the potential for greater certainty, enhanced conceptual simplicity, improved coherence, reduced complexity and compliance costs, and the promotion of fairness and consistency. Against this, the consultation document considers that the disadvantages might be that a principles-based approach might cast a net so broad that unintended transactions might be caught up in it, and that it might be an inadequate or ineffective replacement of existing anti-avoidance provisions. The process of consultation is still on-going, and responses have been mixed. Changes were made to the initial draft legislation relating to disguised interest as a result of a workshop convened in January 2008, but the Government did not proceed, as intended, to introduce principles-based avoidance legislation in the 2008 Finance Bill. It is therefore a little early to assess the likely outcomes of this initiative, but it is clear that this more generic approach to anti-avoidance legislation has strong support in the UK within Government agencies. Other countries are watching with interest. 5 The role of the courts in countering avoidance If the legislatures of the various common law jurisdictions have been active in recent years in seeking to counter tax avoidance activity, their productivity has been more than matched by the judiciaries in those regimes. Cases relating to tax avoidance and tax planning have typically constituted one of the major areas of tax litigation in many of these regimes. This is not to suggest that the respective judiciaries have necessarily been pro-revenue in their deliberations. Indeed, many of the major cases that have recently been heard have provided disappointing outcomes to revenue authorities. Nor is it to suggest that the deliberations of the courts have necessarily provided any greater clarity on the dividing line between what might be regarded as acceptable tax mitigation or unacceptable tax avoidance. The line remains as unclear as ever. But an examination of recent cases, particularly those heard in the superior courts in common law jurisdictions, does reveal some significant developments in the jurisprudence in this area, and in particular shows that there is now a greater certainty in the approaches that those courts are likely to take in the interpretation of the statutory provisions that exist in their respective jurisdictions. Such an examination also leads to the tentative conclusion that there is some level of convergence in the interpretative approaches in many of the common law jurisdictions, although by no means a consensus in how such cases should be approached. Moreover, that degree of convergence that has occurred has come about from very different starting positions and through very different routes. There has been an emphasis in recent UK superior court judgments in cases such as Arctic Systems,91 West v Trennery,92 Barclays Mercantile,93 Scottish Provident,94 McGuckian,95 and MacNiven96 that the role of the judges is to interpret the words of the statute, and to do so in a purposive fashion. As Tiley notes after considering some of those cases, we are left with the simple fact that tax law is about interpreting statutes and that statutes should be interpreted purposivelyand in their context.97 This represents a clear departure from the view that had developed in the UK and elsewhere in the line of cases starting with Ramsay98and developing through Furniss Dawson.99 Those earlier cases had suggested that there was an extra-statutory anti - avoidance rule of law, or doctrine the so-called Ramsay doctrine which was to be applied by the courts when considering avoidance issues. Effectively that doctrine asserted that where there was a preordained transaction or series of transactions which had steps inserted for no commercial purpose, those steps could be ignored and the relevant statutory provisions could be applied to the end result. Andrew Halkyard reminds us of some of the epithets applied to the Ramsay doctrine:100the doctrine of disregard the principle of fiscal nullity a judge-made anti-avoidance weapon a weapon of mass destruction and a broad spectrum antibiotic which kills off all anti - avoidance schemes. Lord Hoffmann, writing on tax avoidance after being involved in the Barclays Mercantile case, states: The primacy of the construction of the particular taxing provision and the illegitimacy of rules of general application has been reaffirmed by. Barclays Mercantile. Indeed, it may be said that this case has killed off the Ramsay doctrine as a special theory of revenue law and subsumed it within the general theory of the interpretation of statutes.101 This does not imply any reversion to a literal approach to statutory interpretation, which was part of the rationale for the emergence of the Ramsay doctrine in the first place. Instead a textual, contextual and purposive approach is likely to underpin judicial reasoning in the UKs consideration of avoidance cases in the future. As Freedman notes: The House of Lords has now confirmed that the essence of the new approach to tax avoidance in the United Kingdom is that the court gives tax provisions a purposive construction in order to determine the nature of the transaction to which it is intended to apply, before going on to decide whether the actual transaction (which might involve considering the overall effect of a number of elements intended to operate together) answers that statutory description.102 This is not to suggest that the current UK position is stable, or that it provides the certainty of outcome that advisers crave. But, it has removed some of the old chaos103 and at least suggests that it is able to provide certainty of approach, if not of outcome. The Ramsay doctrine held particular sway in the UK in part because the UK does not have the provision of last resort that is represented by a statutory general anti - avoidance rule. In that respect it is not dissimilar to the US where a host of judicial doctrines, including the business purpose test, the step transaction doctrine, the sham doctrine and the economic substance doctrine, have prevailed in cases relating to tax avoidance. But although the UK shares with the US the lack of a general anti - avoidance rule, it does not share as Barclays Mercantile has made absolutely clear any tradition in which judicial anti-avoidance doctrines make good statutory deficiencies. There is, however, also evidence of a greater consistency in the interpretative approach to tax avoidance cases taken by the superior courts in countries which do have statutory general anti-avoidance rules. In comparing the outcomes of the two recent anti-avoidance cases to have been heard by the Canadian Supreme Court (Canada Trustco104 and Mathew105) with the UK outcomes in Barclays Mercantile and Scottish Provident, Freedman notes the similarities between the positions reached in the two countries via different routes. In each country the intention of the particular statute concerned, as revealed by its wording construed in context, is paramount in each jurisdiction the fact that a transaction is motivated by tax saving is not, on its own, fatal to its effectiveness for tax minimization purposes.106 In cases such as these, both Canada and the UK have also affirmed that there is no place for a business purpose test along the lines of the doctrine that has prevailed in the US since its seminal case of Helvering v Gregory107in the 1930s. The emerging jurisprudence on Australias general anti-avoidance rule suggests that the courts, in Australia as well as the UK and Canada, must consider the words of the statute interpreted in a purposive fashion, as required by the provisions of the Acts Interpretation Act. The provisions of Part IVA are quite prescriptive, and if interpreted literally could annihilate virtually all tax planning transactions. Part IVA involves a consideration of three basic requirements. Firstly, there must be a scheme. This is so broadly defined as to encompass virtually any act or transaction, although the judgment by the Federal Court in the 2007 Star City case108 has suggested that the existence of a scheme cannot always be taken for granted. The second is that there must be a tax benefit, again broadly defined. The final element, which is the area of greatest contention, is that the scheme must have been entered into for the sole or dominant purpose of obtaining a tax benefit. This requires an objective assessment, based upon analysis of eight factors, including the manner in which the scheme was implemented, its form and substance, and its effect. There is some evidence of a tension between the lower and higher courts in Australia over the interpretation of Part IVA. The Federal and Full Federal Courts have shown themselves willing to adopt a more commercial approach to the interpretation of the provisions. This is not to suggest that a business purpose test has emerged in those courts, but they are certainly more likely to find in favour of the taxpayer where on an objective examination of the circumstances surrounding the transaction they are able to establish a commercial motive for the transaction. In its deliberations, in contrast, the High Court has repeatedly insisted that this is not the appropriate approach, and that the legislation must be construed purposively with a view to establishing the appropriate outcome. Upon occasions this approach has favoured the revenue (Spotless, Hart) and upon others the taxpayers have succeeded (Peabody). Recent judicial decisions in Hong Kong and New Zealand also confirm the purposive approach to the interpretation of taxation statute in common law jurisdictions. For example, the Arrowtown109case in Hong Kong reasserted the need to apply orthodox methods of purposive interpretation to the facts viewed realistically.110 The facts in the Peterson111case in New Zealand, heard by the Privy Council in 2005, bear some resemblance to those in Barclays Mercantile and Canada Trustco, save that the object of investment was films rather than pipelines or trailers. The outcome was also similar, in that the taxpayer was successful in claiming depreciation allowances (the claim was for capital allowances in Barclays Mercantile and capital cost allowance deductions in Canada Trustco). This tends to confirm the view that there is some degree of convergence in the jurisprudence in some of the common law jurisdictions in the approach taken by the courts to avoidance type cases, albeit through the interpretation of very different legislation. The Canadian and New Zealand general anti-avoidance rules have some similarities, but are in substance quite different from each other. And both are very different from the specific legislative provisions that were in play in Barclays Mercantile. The Peterson case also illustrates very clearly the absolute difficulty of determining, with any degree of certainty, where the borderline lies between what Lord Millett (who delivered the majority decision in favour of the taxpayer) deemed an acceptable tax advantage (for which read tax mitigation) as opposed to an unacceptable tax advantage (for which read tax avoidance).112 The Privy Council split three to two in favour of the taxpayer, and it is interesting to note that both the majority judgment (Lord Millett, Baroness Hale and Lord Brown) and the minority judgment (Lord Bingham and Lord Scott) made reference to the fact that this was not a borderline case. The majority regarded it as clear that the general anti-avoidance rule was not applicable by the same token the minority noted, in their judgment, that a clearer case for the application of the New Zealand general anti-avoidance rule can hardly be imagined.113 Drawing the threads together, it can be concluded that the courts and particularly the superior courts in all of the common law jurisdictions examined have reached the position of accepting that taxing statutes, just like other law, are to be consistently interpreted in a purposive fashion, having regard not only to the words of the legislation but also to the intended legislative effect. This convergence exists notwithstanding different starting points and different routes. Above all else though, the inevitable conclusion is reached that despite the large number of cases that have been heard in recent years and despite a greater certainty of interpretive approach by the courts, there is still no certainty of outcome from the courts. The dividing line between acceptable tax mitigation and unacceptable tax avoidance remains as indistinct as ever. As has been noted by Michael Littlewood in writing about decisions of the Privy Council in this area, the line is one of the most difficult in the whole of the law. All in all, to describe the distinction between avoidance and mitigation as vague is to understate the problem, for it suggests that there is general agreement as to roughly where the line lies and that the disagreement is only as to marginal cases. But none of their Lordships appear to have regarded any of the cases as marginal. It is difficult, therefore, to extract from them any guidance as to where the line lies.114 Perhaps it has to be concluded that the courts will never be in a position to provide certainty of outcome, but that consistency of approach is at least a step in the right direction. It may be too cynical to assume the existence of tax avoidance as a constant and perpetual motivation for every taxpayer115, but there is no doubt that tax avoidance is widespread and that it presents a major problem for those concerned with public finance issues. There is some evidence that the aggressive retail marketing of tax avoidance products and schemes may have been constrained in recent years, but avoidance activity is by its nature opportunistic and ad hoc. Simply raising the price of avoidance (through successful containment, increased regulation and constrained supply) will not choke off demand. Indeed, no single response or approach whether administrative, legislative or judicial can adequately or effectively contain avoidance activity. Such containment only begins to occur where strategies drawn from all three spheres complement each other by operating in combination. As Sir Ivor Richardson astutely pointed out some years ago, current requirements for a comprehensive and integrated approach go beyond a more traditional analysis where the legislature exerts control of tax avoidance through special and general anti-avoidance provisions the revenue administration contributes in administering those provisions and exercising discretions and the judiciary is expected to strike the right balance between acceptable and unacceptable tax planning through its interpretation and application of tax legislation.116 Ultimately, however, corporate and personal taxpayers themselves have to take responsibility for the level of avoidance and the degree of acceptance of such behaviour that exists at any time in any society. The revenue authority, the legislature and the judiciary can play a role in shaping the demand for, and supply of, tax avoidance activity, but such issues belong, in the final analysis, in the realms of moral and ethical behaviour of the taxpayers themselves. Corporate and personal social responsibility and the reputational damage that excessive and egregious avoidance activity can attract remains the ultimate deterrent, notwithstanding the impressive arsenal that can be available to those who seek to counter avoidance. Beyond that we should also perhaps be mindful that two of the traditional goals of public finance simplicity and equity have critical roles to play in determining social responses to avoidance activity. In recent years these two goals may have been less prominent in tax reform than the efficiency goal that lends itself to easier economic measurement and evaluation. It is paradoxical that the more complex that the tax regime becomes (often in attempts to contain avoidance activity), the more likely it will be that opportunities for avoidance will arise. Avoidance activity thrives in complexity and uncertainty. And where that complexity exacerbates the natural interaction (sometimes mediated by intermediaries) between the taxpayer and the revenue authority such that it becomes frictional rather than cooperative, there will almost inevitably be a higher probability of avoidance activity. Equity also carries with it the important message that tax systems must not only be fair they must also be perceived to be fair. If vast swathes of the population are not convinced that the tax system does operate fairly (whether it does or not), or that sectional interests hold undue sway or receive inappropriate favours (whether they do or not), they are themselves more likely to engage in the sorts of nefarious activities that they condemn in others. 1The work in this paper draws upon, and updates, my work previously published in this area, including C. Evans, Barriers to Avoidance: Recent Legislative and Judicial Developments in Common Law Jurisdictions, Hong Kong Law Journal, (2007) Vol 37 No 1 C. Evans, Nuclear deterrents, snipers, shotguns and more, Editorial, Australian Tax Review, (2007) Vol 36(3) and C. Evans, The Battle Continues: Recent Australian Experience with Statutory Avoidance and Disclosure Rules, in Beyond Boundaries: Developing Approaches to Tax Avoidance and Tax Risk Management, (edited Freedman J), (2008) Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Oxford. 2A notable exception is the chapter by M. Brooks and J. Head, Tax Avoidance: In Economics, Law and Public Choice, in G. S. Cooper, Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law (Amsterdam: IBFD, 1997). 3 R. Musgrave and P. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice (Singapore: McGraw-Hill, 1989 (Fifth Edition)). 4 For example: N. Tutt, The Tax Raiders: The Rossminster Affair (London: Financial Training, 1985) and The History of Tax Avoidance (London: Wisedene, 1989) J. McBarnet and C. Whelan, Creative Accounting and the Cross-Eyed Javelin Thrower (Chichester: John Wiley, 1999) J. Freedman, Defining Taxpayer Responsibility: In Support of a General Anti-Avoidance Principle, (2004) 4 British Tax Review, 332357) J. Slemrod, An Empirical Test for Tax Evasion, (1985) 67 Review of Economics and Statistics 232238 J. Bankman, The New Corporate Tax Shelters Market, (1999) 83 Tax Notes, 1775 J. Braithwaite, Markets in Vice: Markets in Virtue, (Leichardt: Federation Press, 2005). 5 SARS, Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance, (Law Administration, South African Revenue Service, November 2005) at pp 3, 16, 19. 6V. Tanzi, Globalization Technological Developments and the Work of Fiscal Termites, (Washington DC: International MonetaryFundWP00181,2000). 7J. Braithwaite, Marketsin Vice: Markets inVirtue,(Leichardt: Federation Press, 2005). 8For example, in August 2005 US Government prosecutors secured a US456 million settlement with KPMG LLP as part of a deferred prosecution agreement in which KPMG admitted to fraudulent conduct in the design and marketing of a series of tax shelters including Flip, Opis, Blips and SOS. See also D. Weisbach, Comments on Recent Developments on Tax Shelters in the US, paper presented at Corporation Tax: Breaking Down The Boundaries, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Oxford, 28 and 29 June 2007, in which the author suggests that in the US in 2007 there is a consensus that the large scale retail marketing of tax shelters has slowed significantly. 9 See, for example, ATO, Aggressive Tax Planning End-To-End Process, (ATO Practice Statement LawAdministration PS LA 200525, December 2005). 10See, for example, SARS, Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance, (Law Administration, South African RevenueService, November2005). 11See, for example, Lord Templemans judgment in the case of CIR (NZ) v Challenge Corporation Ltd, 1987 AC 155, and Lord Goffs judgment in Ensign Tankers (Leasing Ltd) v Stokes 1992 1 AC 655. 12R. Woellner, S. Barkoczy, S. Murphy, and C. Evans, Australian Taxation Law, (Sydney: CCH 18th edn,2008), atpp 14841488. 14 International Tax Terms for the Participants in the OECD Programme of Cooperation with Non - OECD Economies (Paris: OECD). 15See, for example, SARS, Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance, (Law Administration, South African RevenueService, November2005). 16International Tax Terms for the Participants in the OECD Programme of Cooperation with Non - OECD Economies (Paris: OECD). 17CIR v Willoughby 1997 4 All ER 65,atp 73. 18SARS, Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance, (Law Administration, South African Revenue Service, November 2005). 19McNiven v Westmoreland 2001 STC 257. 20Walker, Lord, Ramsay 25 Years On: Some Reflections on Tax Avoidance, (2004) LQR 412, at 416. 21SARS, Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance, (Law Administration, South African Revenue Service, November 2005), at p 16. 22 In the Australian Spotless case (FCT v Spotless Services Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 404) nirvana was sought by the taxpayer but on this occasion not attained. 23 The Australian Citylink case (Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Citylink Melbourne Ltd (2006) 80 ALJR128262 ATR6482006 HCA35)more thanadequately illustrates the advantagesof deferral. 24 The 1997 McGuckian case in the UK (IRC v McGuckian 1997 1 WLR 991) is a straightforward example of re-characterisation. That case involved a transfer of shares to a non-resident trust, together with the subsequent sale of the rights to dividends from the shares for a lump sum which, it was unsuccessfully contended, was capital innature. 25As in the UK Barclays Mercantile case (Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v Mawson 2005 STC 1 2004 UKHL 51). 26As in the Australian Peabody case (FC of T v Peabody (1994) 181 CLR 359 94 ATC 4663). 27J. Waincymer, The Australian Tax Avoidance Experience and Responses: A Critical Review, in G. S. Cooper, Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law, (Amsterdam: IBFD, 1997), at p 248. 28Walker, Lord, Ramsay 25 Years On: SomeReflectionsonTaxAvoidance,(2004) LQR412,at 416. 29WT Ramsay Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners 1982 AC 300. 30CIR v Willoughby 1997 4 All ER 65. 31Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltdv Mawson2005 STC1 2004UKHL 51. 32SARS, Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance, (Law Administration, South African Revenue Service, November 2005), at pp 1927. 33SARS, Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance, (Law Administration, South African Revenue Service, November 2005), at p 16. 35J. Braithwaite, Marketsin Vice: Markets inVirtue,(Leichardt: Federation Press, 2005). 36G. Richards, Finance Act Notes: Disclosure of Tax Avoidance Section 19, (2004) 5 British Tax Review,451454,atpp 453454. 37SARS, Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance, (Law Administration, South African Revenue Service, November 2005), at pp 7, 8. 38W. Pederick, Fairand Square Taxation forAustralia,(1984) 19Taxationin Australia6, 575581. 39 US Treasury, The Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters Discussion, Analysis and Legislative Proposals,(Washington DC:United States TreasuryDepartment,1999), at p 19. 40 A derisive term originally coined to describe the property developers who worked with Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen, Premier of Queensland, in a number of suspicious deals in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. 41SARS, Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance, (Law Administration, South African Revenue Service, November 2005), at p 27. 42Her Majestys Revenue and Customs Anti-Avoidance Group Our Vision and Strategy accessed at hmrc. gov. ukavoidancevision-strategy. htm 17 May 2008. Note that the Trade Unions Congress, in a 2008 Touchstone Report, suggested that tax avoidance in the UK was costing 25 billion in lost revenue. As noted by B. Dodwell, Missing Billions Wheres the Evidence, Tax Adviser, March 2008, this figure, representing some 5 of UK total tax yield, is unlikely. 43 M. Boyle, Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage Policy Choices and Political Motivations, (2005) 5 BritishTax Review,527543,at p 531. 44 J. Bankman, An Academics View of the Tax Shelter Battle, in H. Aaron and J. Slemrod (eds), Crisis inTax Administration(Washington DC: BrookingsInstitution Press, 2004), at p 31. 45OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, (Paris: OECD, 1998), at para 30. 46For an overview of recent US initiatives in countering avoidance activity, see D. Weisbach, Comments on Recent Developments on Tax Shelters in the US, paper presented at Corporation Tax: Breaking Down The Boundaries, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Oxford, 28 and 29 June 2007. 47D. Hartnett, Boundaries, Behaviour and Relationships: The Future, paper presented at Corporation Tax: Breaking Down The Boundaries, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Oxford, 28 and 29 June2007. 48 Her Majestys Revenue and Customs Anti-Avoidance Group Our Vision and Strategy accessed at hmrc. gov. ukavoidancevision-strategy. htm 17 May 2008. 49 The latest is theComplianceProgram 200708,availableat ato. gov. au. 50M. DAscenzo, Creating the Right Environment: Transparency, Cooperation and Certainty in Tax, Financial Executives International of Australia Conference, Sydney, 19 June 2007 available at h tt p :ato. g o v. a u c o rp o r ate con te n t. asp. d o cc on te n t 8 57 9 2. h t m . 51M. DAscenzo, A New Dimension, Corporate Tax Association Convention, Sydney, 12 May 2008. 52J. Braithwaite, Marketsin Vice: Markets inVirtue,(Leichardt: Federation Press, 2005). 53J. Braithwaite, Markets in Vice: Markets in Virtue, (Leichardt: Federation Press, 2005), at p 68. 54 J. Braithwaite, Marketsin Vice: Markets inVirtue,(Leichardt: Federation Press,2005),at p178. 55J. Braithwaite, Marketsin Vice: Markets inVirtue,(Leichardt: Federation Press,2005),at p85. 56 See, for example, OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, (Paris: OECD, 1998). 57D. Butler, Tax Administration in an International Context The Study into the Role of Tax Intermediaries, Tax Administration: Safe Harbours and New Horizons, Eighth Atax International Tax Administration Conference, Sydney, March 2008. 58OECD, Studyintothe Role ofTax Intermediaries,(Paris: OECD,2008). 59 OECD, Study into the Role of Tax Intermediaries, (Paris: OECD, 2008), at p 5. 60OECD, Studyintothe Role ofTax Intermediaries,(Paris:OECD,2008),atp6. 61Joint International Tax Shelter Information Centre Memorandum of Understanding, accessed at irs. gov and ato. gov. au 27 October 2006. 62Australia, Canada, UK and US Agree to Establish Joint Task Force, (IRS Newswire IR-2004-61, 3 63Joint International Tax Shelter Information Centre Memorandum of Understanding, accessed at irs. gov and ato. gov. au 27 October 2006. 64 M. Boyle, Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage Policy Choices and Political Motivations, (2005) 5 BritishTax Review,527543,at pp 533534. 65 See M. Dirkis, Looking Beyond Australias Horizon: The internationalisation of Australias Domestic Taxation Information Gathering and Debt Collection Powers, Tax Administration: Safe Harbours and New Horizons, Eighth Atax International Tax Administration Conference, Sydney, March 2008. 66This analogy is provided by A. Halkyard in Not a Weapon of Mass Destruction: Can the Ramsay Approach Apply to the Inland Revenue Ordinance in Hong Kong, (Autumn 2005) 9 Asia-Pacific Journal of Taxation 3, 5672. 6 7The anti-avoidance rules are contained in Income Tax Assessment Act 1997, Pt 2-42. 68 See also, D. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 Chicago Law Review, 869 (1999) in this connection. 69Inland Revenue, A General Anti-Avoidance Rule for Direct Taxes: Consultative Document, (London: Inland Revenue, 1998), at para 4.3. 70E. Liptak, Battling with Boundaries: The South African GAAR Experience, paper presented at Corporation Tax: Breaking Down The Boundaries, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Oxford, 28 and 29 June 2007. 71B. Arnold, The Long, Slow Steady Demise of the General Anti-Avoidance Rule, (2004) Canadian TaxJournal, at 488. 72Mathew v TheQueen2005 SCC 55. 73Accent ManagementLtd ampOthers v CIR (2005) 22NZTC19027. 74Peterson v CIR 2005 STC 448. 75 See, for example, Howland-Rose and Others v FCT 2002 FCA 246 2002 ATC 4200 Vincent v FCT 2002 ATC 4742 Puzey v FCT 2003 ATC 4782 FCT v Sleight 2004 FCAFC 94 2004 ATC 4477. Incontrast, see FCT vCooke ampJamieson2004 FCAFC75 and LenzovFCT2007 ATC 5016. 76 FCT v Peabody (1994) 181 CLR 359 FCT v Spotless Services Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 404 FCT v Consolidated Press HoldingsLtd 2001 HCA 32 FCT vHart 2004HCA 26. 77 D. Pickup, Comparative Study of the Legal Frameworks Used by Different Countries to Protect their Tax Revenues, paper presented at Corporation Tax: Breaking Down The Boundaries, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Oxford, 28 and 29 June 2007. The countries that were examined were the UK, Canada, South Africa, New Zealand, Australia, US, Netherlands and Spain. 78See D. Weisbach, Comments on Recent Developments on Tax Shelters in the US, paper presented at Corporation Tax: Breaking Down The Boundaries, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Oxford, 28 and 29 June 2007 for a review of the significant recent changes to US disclosure rules, including changes to reportable transactions and the obligation for tax shelter promoters to provide lists of clients to the Internal Revenue Service. 79 FinanceAct 2004, ss19andPart7(ss306319). 80 HM Revenue and Customs, Guidance: Disclosure of Tax Avoidance Schemes, (London: HMRC, June 2006), at p 11. 81Cited in J. Tiley, The Avoidance Problem: Some UK Reflections, paper presented at Corporation Tax: Breaking Down The Boundaries, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Oxford, 28 and 29 June 2007. 82Division 290 of Tax Administration Act1953. 83 Chapter 3 Explanatory Memorandum to Tax Laws Amendment (2006 Measures No. 1) Act 2006. 84 Paragraph 3.50 Explanatory Memorandum to Tax Laws Amendment (2006 Measures No. 1) Act 2006. 85 For example, J. King, New Measures Deterring the Promotion of Tax Exploitation Schemes, (2006) Australian Tax Review 35 (3). 86 I. Richardson, Reducing Tax Avoidance by Changing Structures, Process and Drafting in G. S. Cooper, Tax Avoidance andtheRuleof Law, (Amsterdam: IBFD, 1997), at p 338. 87HM Treasury, Pre-Budget Report and SpendingReview, London,2007. 88HM Treasury and HMRC, Principles-based Approach to Financial Products Avoidance: A Consultation Document, London, December 2007. 89Disguised interest schemes exploit differences in tax treatment between interest and other receipts such as dividends, and seek to convert taxable interest into an exempt dividend or capital gain. For example, a person subscribes for shares in a company that only has one asset, which increases in value in the same way as an investment with a guaranteed return. When the shares in the company are sold or redeemed, the return on them equates in substance to an amount from, say, a bank deposit. HM Treasury and HMRC, Principles-based Approach to Financial Products Avoidance: A Consultation Document, London, December2007, atpara 2.1. 90Selling an income stream is a device designed to try to turn economic income into a return that is treated by tax law as capital. HM Treasury and HMRC, Principles-based Approach to Financial Products Avoidance: A Consultation Document, London, December 2007, at para 3.1. 91Jones v Garnett2007 UKHL 35. 93Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltdv Mawson 2005 STC1 2004UKHL 51. 94 Scottish Provident Institution v Inland Revenue Commissioners 2004 UKHL 52 2004 1 WLR 3172(HL). 95IRC vMcGuckian1997 1 WLR991. 96MacNiven v WestmorelandInvestments2001 STC237 (HL). 97 J. Tiley, Barclays and Scottish Provident: Avoidance and Highest Courts: Less Chaos but More Uncertainty,(2005) 3 British Tax Review,273280,at p 273. 98WT Ramsay Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners 1982 AC 300. 99FurnissvDawson 1984 AC 474. 100 A. Halkyard in Not a Weapon of Mass Destruction: Can the Ramsay Approach Apply to the Inland Revenue Ordinance in Hong Kong, (Autumn 2005) 9 Asia-Pacific Journal of Taxation 3, 5672. 101L. Hoffmann, Tax Avoidance,(2005) 2BritishTax Review, pp 197206,at 203. 102J. Freedman, Converging Tracks Recent Developments in Canadian and UK Approaches to Tax Avoidance, (2005)53 Canadian TaxJournal 4, pp 1038-1046, at1040-1041. 103 J. Tiley, Barclays and Scottish Provident: Avoidance and Highest Courts: Less Chaos but More Uncertainty,(2005) 3 British Tax Review,273280atp 274. 104The Queenv Canada TrsutcoMortgage Co 2005 SCC 54. 105Mathew v TheQueen2005 SCC 55. 106J. Freedman, Converging Tracks Recent Developments in Canadian and UK Approaches to Tax Avoidance, (2005) 53 Canadian Tax Journal 4, pp 1038-1046, at 1039. 10769F 2nd 809 (1934). 108Star City Pty Ltd v FCT 2007 FCA 1701. 109CollectorofStampRevenue vArrowtown Assets Ltd 2004 1 HKLRD 77. 110A. Halkyard, Not a Weapon of Mass Destruction: Can the Ramsay Approach Apply to the Inland Revenue Ordinancein HongKong, (Autumn2005) 9Asia-Pacific Journalof Taxation3, 5672. 111Petersen v CIR 2005 STC 448. 112Petersen v CIR 2005 STC448,at paras 3537. 113Petersen v CIR 2005 STC448, at para 96. 114 M. Littlewood, The Privy Council and the Australasian Anti-Avoidance Rules, (2007) 2 British Tax Review, 175205. 115C. H. Gustafson, The Politics and Practicalities of Checking Tax Avoidance in the United States in G. S.Cooper, TaxAvoidance and theRule of Law,(Amsterdam: IBFD,1997), at p 376. 116 I. Richardson, Reducing Tax Avoidance by Changing Structures, Process and Drafting in G. S. Cooper, Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law, (Amsterdam: IBFD, 1997), at p 327. Previously published by the University of New South Wales 8211 Australian School of Taxation (Atax), June 2008Govt lost P15.6 B in 2013 due to illicit tobacco trade study MANILA, Philippines - The government lost an estimated P15.6 billion in taxes last year due to illicit tobacco trade in the country, according to a report by UK-based Oxford Economics and US-based International Tax and Investment Center. Because of illicit tobacco trade, the government is losing over P15 billion it should have been collecting from tobacco excise tax, Adrian Cooper, chief executive officer at Oxford Economics, said in a briefing yesterday in Makati. Cooper described the amount as representing a surge of 497 percent or almost sixfold from the P2.6 billion estimated in taxes lost to the illegal trade of tobacco products. The report, commissioned by Philip Morris International Inc. was designed to measure the consumption of illicit cigarettes those sold in the domestic market but fail to comply with the right tax dues in the Philippines and its impact on revenue losses for the government. While the administration can be pleased they have achieved a 114-percent increase in tobacco excise revenue in 2013 as a result of the new tax regime, one cannot ignore the tax foregone as a result of this very rapid growth in the illicit cigarette trade, with domestic illicit cigarettes making up the lions share of this, Cooper said. The report found that 19.1 billion illicit cigarettes were consumed in the country last year, almost three times the estimated 6.4 billion illegally traded cigarettes used in 2012. Business ( Article MRec ), pagematch: 1, sectionmatch: 1 This means one out of five cigarettes consumed in the country last year were illegally traded, with an estimated 105.5 billion cigarettes used in 2013. The rise in consumption of domestic illicit cigarettes followed the sharp increase in the price of cigarettes, particularly in the super low-price segment where widely available and popular brands are observed selling below total tax and cost of production, Cooper said. Not only is this indicative of tax evasion, it also undermines the public health goal of the tax reforms, to make cigarettes less affordable. We understand this practice is currently the subject of a number of investigations, and we encourage vigilance and perseverance in addressing the issue, he continued Cooper recounted that a big chunk or 90 percent of the 19.1 billion illicit cigarettes consumed last year were manufactured locally. Without appropriate safeguards put in place theres a danger that the scale of tax evasion weve seen right now could further escalate, Cooper said, although he declined to name brands thought to be responsible for the illicit trade of cigarettes. Cooper said the report will be presented to officials from the Bureau of Customs, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the Department of Finance during the day (Thursday). Republic Act 10351 or the Sin Tax Law, which took effect Jan. 1 last year, raised the prices of alcohol and tobacco products to rake in more revenues for health care programs and efforts supporting tobacco farmers in the country. Latest data from the BIR showed excise tax collections from tobacco products rose 14.22 percent to P11.34 billion in the four months to April from the same period a year ago. This figure exceeded the P10.85-billion target for the period. Together with dues collected from alcoholic beverages, excise taxes from all sin products summed up to P23.02 billion as of April, up 11.83 percent from the same period last year. Last year, the BIR collected P100.9 billion in sin taxes, breaching its P85.86-billion goal for the year.
Design de sistema de negociação de alta freqüência e gerenciamento de processos Design de sistema de negociação de alta freqüência e gerenciamento de processos Conselheiro: Roy E. Welsch. Departamento: Programa de Design e Gestão de Sistemas. Editora: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Data de emissão: 2009 As empresas comerciais hoje em dia são altamente dependentes da mineração de dados, modelagem de computadores e desenvolvimento de software. Os analistas financeiros executam muitas tarefas semelhantes às das indústrias de software e fabricação. No entanto, o setor financeiro ainda não adotou completamente estruturas de engenharia de sistemas de alto padrão e abordagens de gerenciamento de processos que tenham sido bem sucedidas nas indústrias de software e fabricação. Muitas das metodologias tradicionais para design de produtos, controle de qualidade, inovação sistemática e melhoria contínua encontradas em disciplinas de engenharia podem ser aplicadas no campo financeiro. Esta t...
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